

✓  
1942

**BRITISH EMBASSY, BAGDAD.**

No.: 152.

FO 624/28

PART ONE

FROM 1 - 30

Name of File:—

IRAN.

KURDS.

(No minutes to be written here.)

LAST Year's File No.: ✓

16

NEXT Year's File No.: \_\_\_\_\_

Iran: Kurds

152/29/42

TELEGRAM.

How received:

Code

From: Sir Reader Bullard To: H. M. AMBASSADOR,

TEHRAN.

BAGDAD.

Copies to: GOC

Despatched: 3.2.42 14.35 hrs

Received: 4.2.42 08.00 hrs

Decyphered: 4.2.42 10.50 hrs

No. 37

of 3.2.42.

Addressed to BAGDAD TEL NO. 37

repeated to Foreign Office No. 163.

Following is repetition of tel No. 6  
addressed to Kermanshah January 30th:-

Your telegram No. 16.

Minister of War informed the Military  
Attache on January 29th that orders had been  
issued to Shahbakhti not to carry out any  
executions without reference to Tehran.

CB  
MR  
RK

File with O.S.

4/2

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Iran: Kurds

152/28/42.

SAVINGRAM.

h.v.  
3.2.42. Copies to G.O.C., A.O.C., C.I.C.I.

From: H.M. MINISTER, TEHRAN.

To: FOREIGN OFFICE.

No.: 112.

Date: 24th January 1942.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 112 {Pl. repeat to Kuiby'ff  
as my No. 34.  
repeated to India ..... " 55,  
" to Ankara ..... " 19,  
" to Cairo SAVING " 15,  
" to Baghdad " " 15.



My telegram No. 105.

According to Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Soviet Ambassador has given permission for some Persian  
troops to go to MESHED via SEMNAN and holds out some  
hope that the number of police in REZAIH may be increased.

2. Turkish Ambassador has received slightly less  
pessimistic report from Turkish Consul at REZAIH. I hope  
to receive shortly report from H.M. Consul who left TABRIZ  
for REZAIH January 20th.

BULLARD.

1/2  
C.I.C.I.  
1/4/42  
N 4/2

152  
SAVINGRAM.

Iran: Kurds

152/27/42

22

5.142 Copies to G.O.C. A.O.C. C.I.C.I.

From: H.M. Minister, THERAN.

To: FOREIGN OFFICE.

No.: 105

Date: 22nd January 1942.

*Copies  
G.O.C.  
A.O.C.  
C.I.C.I.*  
152/17/42

Addressed to Foreign Office	No. 105,
repeated to Kuibysheff	" 31,
" to Ankara	" 16,
" to India	" 50,
" to Cairo SAVING	" 14,
" to Baghdad "	" 14.



My telegram No. 103 to Foreign Office.

I am informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Interior that they and the Prime Minister discussed with the Soviet Ambassador January 19th the question of the despatch of Persian troops to disturbed areas in the North and that Ambassador replied as follows:-

TABRIZ: he could not agree,

REZAIEH: he had asked for instructions but could not promise.

KHALKHAL AREA: he was more hopeful but could make no promise.

MESHED: (where a certain Saulat-al-Saltana is said to be in revolt); troops might go to Meshed which was not in Soviet occupation but could not go via Semnan which is occupied by Soviet troops unless he first got permission from Moscow.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs points out that only practicable route is via Semnan, alternative being via Kerman. I suggested that the Soviet authorities might be less difficult after the conclusion of the treaty.

*H.V.  
Gover v. G. 5.242  
H.V. 4/12  
V. 4/12*  
BULLARD.

152

Iran: Kurds

152/26/42.

No. 4.

(22/25/42)



British Legation,

Tehran.

24th January, 1942.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 2  
(152/3/42) of the 12th January. The statement made by the

Persian Minister for War to the effect that British planes  
had been used to drop leaflets was, of course, incorrect and  
the Persian Government was asked to publish a correction.  
This was done over the Tehran radio and also published in  
the vernacular press.

2. The statement of the Minister of War was also  
inaccurate as to the tenour of the notice issued. What was  
said to the Kurds is, as you suggest, shown in the enclosure  
to the despatch from His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah,  
No. 72 dated the 17th December, of which you received a copy.  
For various reasons, however, I thought it inadvisable to  
ask for a correction of the Minister's statement in this  
respect also.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Foreign  
Office with a copy of the notice in question.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,

Sir K. Cornwallis, K.C.M.G.,  
C.B.E., D.S.O., etc., etc.,  
British Embassy,  
BAGDAD.

Ke  
Cush  
Kobe  
16/289/41  
24/2

Iran: Kurds

152/25/42

# COPY OF TELEGRAM.

PARAP  
Direct

Copies G.O.C., A.O.C., C.I.C.I.

From H.M. AMBASSADOR,

BAGDAD.

To Sir R. Bullard, Tehran.

Date 31st January, 1942

No. 29

Time despatched 12.00 hrs.

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 29

Repeated to Foreign Office, No. 109,  
Kermanshah, No. 1.

Kermanshah telegrams 16 and 17 to you.

From my point of view it is important that Persians should, so far as possible, avoid action likely to have unfavourable repercussions among Kurds in Iraq. I don't know who six men are whose execution is intended but if they are prominent chiefs who have been picked out for retaliatory punishment, Iraqi Kurds would be affected.

CORNWALLIS.

VH/KC  
RND  
JM  
RK

152/20/42 }  
23

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Iran: Kurds 152/24/42.

# TELEGRAM.

How received :

PARAP

From :

Foreign Office,  
London.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

BAGDAD.

Copies to : GOC

AOC

CICI

Despatched : 29/1/42, 02.30 hrs.

Received : 30/1/42, 08.00 "

Decyphered : " 10.40 "

No. Unnumbered

of 28th January, 1942

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 149

Repeated to Bagdad  
Govt. of India  
Angora  
Cairo.

No. 80.

Your telegram No. 48, and Bagdad telegram

Please press the Persian Government to communicate their plan for remedying the Kurdish grievance.

There is presumably some danger lest Persian military successes against the Kurdish tribes should render the Persian Government less disposed to make even reasonable concessions. It is most important that they should make a real attempt to reach a settlement.

2. Have you yet prepared a scheme as instructed in paragraph 4 of my telegram 1258. If so, please telegraph details.

CB/GDM  
JM  
RK

*KE Vm*

*H. G. 21/1*

*This seems to be a  
move in the right direction*

*V.H.  
30/1*

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*any distribution  
of 1/20/-*

*Feb. also see  
Feb. 6. minute*

*152/14/42  
13/13/42*

*16/298/41*

*M. Edmunds  
16/2/42  
O.S.*

152

Iran: Kurds

152/23/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received:

From: British Consul,  
KERMANSHAH

To: H. M. AMBASSADOR,  
BAGDAD.

PARAP

Copies to: 600

Despatched: 29.1. 0235

Received: 29.1. 1930

Decyphered: 29.1. 2245

He stated.

No. 7

of 29th Jan. 1942.

Send to  
CGL only

152/20/42}

Has I  
sent  
30/1

HE

IMPORTANT

Addressed to TEHRAN tel. No. 17.

Repeated to Bagdad for General Iraq.

My immediately preceding telegram.

+(w.g.) I am informed that Iranian  
authorities intend to shoot only six agents.

Kurds  
1/4

2. Wholesale shootings are not it seems,  
contemplated - at least not at present - I  
presume intervention by me unnecessary.

I have given a copy of of this telegram  
together with - 120/1 - to Col Boyce  
He will telegraph to Col Fletcher  
the Political Adviser at Kermanshah  
asking for comment - pointing out  
that it is important that nothing  
should be done by the Persians which  
would influence the Kurds in Iraq and  
asking for information about the  
men whose execution is proposed.

JP  
JB/RK

152.  
We shall also  
write to Tehran  
Please draft  
36-1

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1/4 30/1

152

Iran: Kurds

152/22/42

TELEGRAM.

How received :

From : Foreign Office  
LONDON

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,  
BAGDAD.

Copies to : GOC  
AOC  
CICI

Despatched : 27.1. 0230  
Received : 28.1. 0900  
Decyphered : 28.1. 1135

PARAP

No. 98

of 26th Jan. 1942.

Addressed to Kuibyshev tel. No. 158 of  
26th Jan.

Repeated to: Tehran  
Govt. of India  
Cairo  
Bagdad  
Angora.

Your tel. No. 88.

Your appreciation of the probable Soviet intentions in North Iran is most useful, and I have noted in particular the view expressed in your para. 7. You will have seen from my tel. No. 116 to Tehran the terms of the communication made to the Soviet Ambassador. I have not thought it wise to go further than the statement in para. 4. of that telegram at the present juncture.

2. The Soviet Ambassador told me on 22nd January that he had forwarded this note to his Government. He seemed concerned by the picture we had drawn, and said he found it very difficult in view of the assurances which he had previously received from his Government as a result of my representation. I said that I feared the position was as depicted, and it might be that the local authorities were shewing too much zeal. Such things had been known to happen before in the history of more than one country. At the same time, I wished the Soviet Government to know that I had advised both the Turkish Government and the Iranian Government to approach them direct in these matters. I thought better results could probably be obtained that way.

CW/SMK  
JB/RK

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*152/12/42*  
*GOC*  
*AOC*  
*CICI*  
*VH*

*152/12/42*

*152/18/42*

*Sanctuary*  
*missing here?*

*H2*  
*VH*  
*28/1*  
*28/1*

12/302

Iran. Kurds

152/21/42.

BRITISH LEGATION,  
TEHRAN.  
18th January 1942.

No. 22/15/42.



Dear Chancery,

Our telegram No. 516 of 17th  
December 1940.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs  
states that he has twice telegraphed  
to the Persian Minister in BAGHDAD  
instructing him to ask the Iraqi  
Government to try to induce Muhammed  
Rashid to leave Persia and return  
to Iraq.

**PASSED TO**

**FOR ACTION**

Yours ever,

CHANCERY.

The Chancery,  
British Embassy,  
BAGHDAD.

362  
cf. 16/303/41

4 VA

29/1/42

Not at present

with 28/1

*[Handwritten notes and signatures]*  
Whether P.E.  
whether any further  
action to be taken  
at present

*passed to G.O.C.*

152

Iran: Kurds 152/20/42  
**TELEGRAM.**

How received :

PARAP

From :

Consul,  
Kermanshah.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

BAGDAD.

Copies to :

Despatched : 27/1/42, 20.00 hrs.

Received : 28/1/42, 08.30 "

Decyphered : " 10.30 "

No. 6

of 27th January, 1942

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 16

Repeated to Bagdad, No. 6, for General  
Iraq.

+Your telegram No. 5 of January 26th.

Before intervening I am asking British military authorities to confirm report regarding Iranian authorities' alleged intention to shoot Kurdish prisoners. As intervention on humanitarian grounds is likely to be misunderstood, I think intervention on my part almost certain to invite a severe rebuff and that such action would strengthen Iranian G.O.C.'s suspicions that H.M.G. is supporting Kurds and are placing obstacles in Iranian Govt.'s efforts to restore order.

2. Assuming demarche at Iranian Ministry of War is not feasible, do you not think shooting could best be averted if unofficial friendly hints were given to Iranian O.C. Senna<sup>+</sup> through O.C. British troops there? In that way there would be less likelihood ++ ing Iranian ++ resentment at our ~~intervention~~ interference.

3. Pending your reply I am taking no action.

+ 1 change

++ wrong group

END  
JM  
RK

*Adams I feel sure we have  
received a communication of  
some kind referring to  
Persian intention to kill 150  
Kurdish captives. Please  
give me a reference No 28/1.*

*Please see Kermanshah*

*Evolution report? No 15? flagged*

*refile 5-9. I am disturbed 15th*

*4 fano.*

*Send to  
GOC only*

*Not Recd  
+ 1 change*

*NA 301*

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THE BUREAU

To: H. M. AMBASSADOR

From:

How received

PARAF

General

Reimbursement

Copies to:

that the shooting of  
130 Kurds would be  
a bad thing, though it  
is necessarily difficult  
to judge the situation from  
here.

HA 29/1

OB.

I think it would be a good  
thing to have a mission  
discussion in Iraq -  
very well-acted action.  
Could you find out what  
are doing - I think  
the must win Tehran -

RM  
JM  
RK

22

100

100

100

100

100

153  
No. 1.  
(2/4/42)

Iran : Kurds

152/19/A2.

HIS Majesty's Representative in Turkey presents his compliments  
to H.M. Ambassador, Bagdad,  
and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Angora, 14th January 1942.



*Reference to previous correspondence :*

152  
15  
42 }

Angora telegram No.2 Saving of 14th January.

*Description of Enclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
To Foreign Office, P.L. No.9, dated 14th January 1942.	Encloses Note from Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning activities of disturb- ing elements in Western Iran.

HS *W 271*  
*J.E. has already seen  
a summary of this  
at - 1/15/-  
14271.*

(Similar letter to Tehran, Cairo, India. )

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No. 9.  
(2/4/42)

His Majesty's Representative in Turkey presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

**14th January , 19 42.**

*Reference to previous correspondence :*

**Angora telegram No.94 of 14th January.**

*Description of Enclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
<b>Note from Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No.20315 G., dated 10th January 1942.</b>	<b>Activities of disturbing elements in Western Iran.</b>

(Similar letter to **Tehran, Bagdad, Cairo, India.**)

COPY.

**TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ**  
**HARİCİYE VEKÂLETİ**

20315

9.

Comme suite à ses aide-mémoire des 1er et 12 décembre 1941 et se référant à la communication du 25 décembre 1941, No. 367-103-41<sup>73</sup> de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique, le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de porter à Sa connaissance les informations suivantes qui lui sont parvenues au sujet des menées des éléments de trouble dans la région ouest de l'Iran.

1.- L'attitude complaisante des forces d'occupation soviétiques envers ces éléments, aurait, selon toute vraisemblance, une large part dans la conception et la préparation du mouvement irrédentiste kurde, auquel, comme il a été signalé dans l'aide-mémoire du 1er décembre du Ministère, viendrait s'ajouter un mouvement corollaire des éléments arméniens et assyriens.

Il se confirme en effet que c'est sur l'invitation des autorités soviétiques que les chefs notables des tribus kurdes se sont rendus dernièrement à Bakou, afin d'y participer à une réunion qui discuterait des moyens de la mise en œuvre des principes inhérents à ce mouvement. Auraient notamment pris part à ladite réunion, Kotas, Hasan Ömer, Hasan Tello, Abbas, Ali, respectivement chefs des tribus de Mehmedi, de (J.J.I.A.A.I.) de Dirî, de Fockan et de Hazeril, ainsi que le nommé Ağazade, propriétaire de trois journaux paraissant à Tabriz.

Chacune de ces personnes aurait reçu, comme cadeau de la part des autorités soviétiques, un fusil, des étoffes et un appareil de radio. A leur retour à Rixaiye, ils auraient été salués par des centaines de Kurdes qui portaient des drapeaux et des pancartes renfermant les portraits de Staline et de Molotov et qui auraient manifesté dans les rues au cri de "Vive le bolchévisme".

Il semble que c'est à l'issue de cette réunion qu'il a été décidé de créer un organe central sous la dénomination du "Haut comité kurde de Saint - Hedjet", comme noyau du nouvel État indépendant.

Des réunions auraient été également tenues par la suite à Rixaiye, à l'hôtel Ladan et à l'hôtel Erşindjan, où les membres kurdes, arméniens et assyriens auraient été invités à prêter le serment de fidélité à la cause de l'indépendance. Le Comité compterait d'ores et déjà dix mille adhérents et serait dirigé notamment par les chefs Kurdes Mehmet Vusuk, Hasan Tello, Piruz, İsmet, le savant assyrien Had et quelques arméniens. Il aurait proclamé, au moyen de tracts apposés sur les murs de la ville, qu'en cas où il ne se verrait pas confier le pouvoir local, il s'en emparerait de force. Un Assyrien dissident aurait été assassiné, de même que le chef adjoint de la section politique de la police à Rixaiye. Le Gouverneur même, le général Kopal, aurait couru le danger d'être l'objet d'un attentat.

Les autorités d'occupation soviétiques qui avaient autorisé au début la police de Rixaiye à disposer de 100 agents, ne lui auraient pas permis par la suite d'en avoir plus de 45, sous la menace de les disperser tous au cas où ce nombre viendrait à être dépassé, alors que les éléments kurdes, arméniens et assyriens de cette région détiendraient au moins une dizaine de milliers de fusils.

Lendites/

l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique  
En Ville.

Lesdites autorités se refuseraient à recevoir les plaintes qui leur sont adressées par la population locale, sous le prétexte qu'elles ne se considèrent pas en droit d'intervenir dans les affaires intérieures du pays. Dans leur zèle de soutenir les éléments de trouble, elles seraient allées même jusqu'à libérer les criminels et les assassins détenus par les autorités iraniennes.

2.- C'est également lors de la réunion de Bakou que la G.P.U. de cette ville aurait ordonné aux chefs kurdes de riposter par les armes, au cas où la gendarmerie iranienne s'aviserait de les désarmer. Le chef de la tribu de Chikak, Ömer Han, dont les bandes auraient désarmé et pillé auparavant les villages de Kotch et de Djémalaga, après avoir conféré à Tabriz avec les nommés Hasan Tello et Mehmet Aga, en vue de former une organisation locale, serait revenu à Chahpour, où les forces armées soviétiques l'auraient pourvu d'un nombre assez considérable d'armes, à l'instar des autres chefs de tribus qui auraient été munis également de fusils et d'armes automatiques.

A la suite de l'assassinat de deux individus appartenant à la bande de Herki, le chef de cette tribu kurde, le nommé Rechko, aurait mis à sac les villages situés aux environs de Rizaiye et en aurait tué vingt habitants. D'ailleurs, cet incident n'est pas unique dans la région de Rizaiye où des cas de banditisme de toutes sortes ont lieu journellement aussi bien dans la ville que dans les villages. Il est significatif d'autre part qu'à la suite de chaque incident, les lignes télégraphiques se trouvent coupées par les bandits.

3.- Les autorités des forces d'occupation soviétiques auraient donné libre cours à la propagande irrédentiste en Azerbaïdjan iranien, comme il a été signalé dans l'aide-mémoire du 15 décembre dernier, et feraient paraître quelques journaux en langue turque, laissant accréditer la croyance que les Turcs de l'Azerbaïdjan russe parlent librement leur langue, que des écoles enseignent la langue azerbaidjanienne ont été ouvertes jusque dans les villages et que les Turcs s'y trouvant mènent une vie heureuse.

L'intention arrêtée des autorités d'occupation soviétiques de ne pas laisser aux autorités locales le soin d'assurer l'ordre et la sécurité dans toute cette région, est confirmée par les nouvelles parvenues de sources sûres. La démarche faite par le gouverneur de Tabriz, Fahimi, dans le but d'obtenir l'autorisation d'avoir à sa disposition une force de gendarmerie suffisante pour rétablir l'ordre dans le vilayet de Tabriz fut en effet vouée à un échec, les autorités des forces d'occupation soviétiques ne lui ayant pas permis de réprimer par la force les bandes qui s'étaient soulevées contre le pouvoir local.

Dans cet ordre d'idées, il convient de relever que le gouvernement soviétique, étant désireux de voir la population kurde de l'Iran garder intactes ses particularités raciales, se déciderait à ne pas tolérer que les forces iraniennes usent des moyens de contrainte contre elle.

Ankara, le 10 janvier 1942.

Iran: Kurds 152/18/42  
**TELEGRAM.**

How received :

PARAP

From :

Foreign Office,  
London.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

BAGDAD.

Copies to :

Despatched : 22/1/42, 05.20 hrs.

Received : 23/1/42, 14.00 "

Decyphered : 24/1/42, 10.40 "

No. 84

of 21st January, 1942

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 116

Repeated to Angora, 149,  
Knibyshev, 130,  
Govt. of India, 1349  
Bagdad, 84  
Cairo, 384.

Your telegram No. 76.

Following is summary of a note which I  
have sent to the Soviet Ambassador on January 21st.

2. Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians at Rezaieh are reported to have formed a committee with the object of expelling Persian Govt. officials and setting up independent local Govts. in their place. Disorder and number of murders are said to have occurred as a result of which the Persian Governor, his officials and about 400 residents have fled.

3. The Soviet Government will agree that it is most desirable that public order and security should be maintained throughout Persia. If lawlessness were allowed to develop unchecked our two governments might be obliged to intervene to restore and maintain order, thus immobilizing considerable numbers of troops who might be urgently needed elsewhere.

4. Moreover, the spread of the disturbances, such as might result if the Persian Govt. were not in a position to maintain law and order, might well affect the security of the routes by which essential military supplies are being sent to the Soviet Union. There can, indeed, be little doubt that serious disorders in the Persian provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan would affect the amount of military material reaching the Soviet Union through north-west Persia.

5. H.M. Government, moreover, feel bound to bear in mind that the Turkish Government, who continue to receive reports from Tabriz and Rezaieh of further disorders, are seriously disturbed by these developments so near to their frontiers. In view of the interest expressed by M. Stalin during the Moscow conversations in encouraging the Turkish Govt. to maintain their position as a bulwark against Germany, I feel that I should point out that according to Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, the anxiety over the situation in Persian Kurdistan is at present the chief obstacle to the improvement of Turko-Soviet relations. Owing to her geographical position Turkey is vitally interested in the maintenance of the status quo in Persian

/Azerbaijan.

CW/SMK/JP

JM

RK

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**Azerbaijan.** It is, therefore, most desirable that Turkey's fears on this score should be allayed lest if they continue they should react on her whole policy as regards the war and even undermine her determination to resist a German attack.

recognise

6. H.M.G. ~~recognise~~ that it is clearly the duty of the Persian Govt. to maintain internal security throughout the whole country. They understand, however, that the Soviet Govt. have not felt able to allow the Persian Govt. to send troops or to reinforce the gendarmerie in the areas occupied by the Soviet troops while the local authorities at Tabriz and Rezaieh were ordered to reduce police in these towns by one half.

7. If this is indeed the case I would suggest for consideration of the Soviet Government that since it is the duty of the Persian Govt. to restore order, they should be allowed to maintain as many police and gendarmerie in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan as they consider necessary, and should be allowed to discipline them with a reasonable number of troops. It also seems desirable that the Soviet authorities in these areas should be instructed to cooperate with the Persian authorities in restoring order.

8. In requesting that the Soviet Ambassador will convey this suggestion to his government, the note adds that the foregoing policy has been followed in British occupied areas. Finally as regards the Turkish Govt., H.M. Ambassador at Angora has been instructed to suggest to them that they should approach the Soviet Govt. direct in matters of this kind.

OW/SMK/JP  
JM  
RK

152

Iran: Kurds 152/12/42  
**TELEGRAM.**

How received :  
Parap

From : Sir R. Bullard,  
TEHRAN.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,  
BAGDAD.

Copies to : GOC  
ROC  
CIC

Despatched : 22.1.42. 15.00 hrs

Received : 22.1.42 21.00 hrs

Decyphered : 23.1.42 11.35 hrs

No. 29

of 22.1.42.

Addressed to FOREIGN OFFICE NO. 103  
(Please pass to Govt. of India  
No. 40)

repeated to Angora  
Bagdad,  
Cairo,  
Kuibyshev.

Over 600 and more refugees arrived from Rezaieh yesterday and still more are coming. The committee is reported to be living on loot and robbery while in the meantime the police do not venture out. Some members are said to be forcing villages to sign in favour of an independent government of the Soviet type. I have had a long conversation with my Soviet colleague to-day and hope that the Russian forces will be instructed to support the police in the interests of law and order. The above was received from Tabriz, tel No. 13 of Jan. 17th.

MS: 2411

GDAM/CB  
MWR  
RK

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152

SAVINGRAM.

Iran: Kurds 152/16/42.

COPY TO GOC AUC CCIC Smith 152/14.15/42

From: H.M. Minister, TEHRAN.

TO: FOREIGN OFFICE.

No.: 87.

Date: 18th January 1942.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 87,  
 repeated to Ankara ..... " 12,  
 " to Kuibysheff ... " 27,  
 " to Gov. of India SAVING No. 2,  
 " to Baghdad ..... " 12,  
 " to Cairo ..... " 11.



Following is repetition of TABRIZ telegram No.9, of January 14th.

BEGINS: Governor-General REZAIH has resigned and Mayor fled here while Chief of Police refuses to go outside his house. Two Gendarmes, not four, were murdered, two Assyrian partisans were arrested but Russians compelled their release.

2. Soviet authorities here today ordered any machine guns held by the Gendarmerie to be sent to TEHRAN.

3. Soviet Consul-General denies to me any Russian undesirable propaganda or interference, and even denies existence of political officers here! He was taken aback when I recited the four worst offenders' names. Perhaps he, like the Soviet Ambassador, is kept in ignorance of these persistent and stupid activities. It seems to be the policy of Outer-Mongolia and Sin-Kiang again, and may soon exasperate the Turks alleged by Soviet authorities to be massed on Iranian frontier. Local authorities are completely discouraged and will do nothing positive to redress the situation unless the Russians first dis-avow their apparent intrigues among population. ENDS.

BULLARD.

Cover to  
 GOC  
 AUC  
 CCIC  
 Smith

He  
 Curran  
 H. T. C. 24/1

24/1

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Iran: Kurds 152/15/42. 2/8/42.  
Bagdad

Com. G. G. A. A. 8 C. K. I. (See 11/4/42)

Telegram  
No. 94  
DIPP.

From: Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Angora  
To: Mr Eden, Foreign Office  
Rptd. Tehran No. 6; Bagdad No. 2 Saving;  
Cairo No. 5 Saving; Govt. of India  
No. 1 Saving.

Dated: 14th January 1942  
Despd. " " 18.50



My telegram No. 2916 and my telegram No. 69.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs have now sent me a third Aide Memoire dated January 10th.

2. This, after referring to Soviet "toleration" of manifestations mentioned in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 2839, alleges (contrary to statement of Monsieur Molotov reported in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 2684) that it was at Soviet authorities' invitation that Kurdish chiefs (of whom five are quoted by name) went to Baku to discuss plans for Kurdish independence. Aide Memoire states that each chief was presented by Soviet authorities with cloth, a rifle and a wireless set. On their return to Rizaiyeh they are stated to have been welcomed by hundreds of Kurds bearing flags and portraits of Stalin and Molotov and shouting "long live Bolshevism".

3. According to Aide Memoire it was decided at Baku to set up a Central "Deliverance" Committee as the nucleus of the new Kurdish Independent State.

4. Further meetings are then stated to have been held at Rizaiyeh at which the oath of independence was administered to Kurdish, Armenian and Assyrian members of the Committee, which is alleged already to comprise 10,000 members and to have publicly announced that if it were not given local powers it would take them by force. Dissidents are said to have been subjected to violence.

5. Aide Memoire then alleges circumstance mentioned in last sentence of paragraph one of Tehran telegram No. 42 and adds that Kurdish, Armenian and Assyrian tribal elements hold at least 10,000 rifles.

6. It alleges that Soviet authorities pay no attention to complaints of the population and even go so far as to set at liberty criminals held by the Iranian authorities.

7. At Baku G.P.U. is stated to have ordered Kurdish Chiefs to use force if the Iranian police attempted to disarm them. Banditry is said to be rife in and around Rizaiyeh.

8. Soviet forces of occupation are said to be giving free rein to irredentist propaganda in Persian Azerbaijan and for this purpose to be spreading reports of the very satisfactory conditions in which the Turks in Russian Azerbaijan are said to live.

9. Copy of Aide Memoire by bag.

10. Please repeat to Kuibyshev as my telegram No. 5.

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Iran: - Kurds

152/14/42

SAVINGRAM.

Cop. Coc Asl ECTCT (See 154/14/42)

From: H.M. Minister, TEHRAN.

To: FOREIGN OFFICE.

No.: 48

Date: 9th January 1942.

Addressed to Foreign Office No. 48,  
repeated to India ..... " 21,  
" to Ankara ..... " 6,  
" to Cairo SAVING " 7,  
" to Baghdad " 7.



16/298/41 } Your telegram No. 1258.

Iranian Government confident that recent military operations have removed danger for some time. Meanwhile publication of our declaration that our policy is to encourage the Iranian Government to restore their authority in KURDISTAN and to redress all legitimate grievances has both given the Iranian Government evidence of our sincerity and exposed falsity of the Kurdish leaders' assurances to their followers that the Kurdish movement was supported by H.M. Government.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs admits that Persian Victories over the Kurds are not a solution and that grievances must be remedied. It is however doubtful whether the military authorities share this view. I am asking Iranian Government to impart their plans of reform to us so that you may be informed.

3. I hope that the situation foreshadowed in para.4 of

your /

INDEX

MASTON

your telegram under reply will not now arise but I will  
discuss with General QUINAN January 12th. Unfortunately  
there is no Kurdish who would command general respect as  
Governor of Kurdistan.

BULLARD.

Your telegram No. 1258.

British Government content that recent military  
operations have removed power for some time.  
Institution of our policy is to  
restore the British Government to restore this authority  
in Kurdistan and to release all legitimate grievances  
both given the British Government evidence of our sincerity  
and exposed falsity of the Kurdish leaders' assurances to  
their followers that the Kurdish movement was supported by

British Government.

British Government for Foreign Affairs states that Kurdistan  
violations over the Kurds are not a solution and that relief  
measures must be taken. It is however a difficult matter the  
British Government authorized this view.

British Government is aware of the fact that you

British Government.

British Government is aware that the situation is serious in Kurdistan.

Yours

Iran: Kurds. 152/13/42  
**COPY OF TELEGRAM.**

Copies to G.O.C., C.I.C.I., A.O.C.,

From H.M. AMBASSADOR,  
BAGDAD.

To Foreign Office.

Date 22nd January, 1942.

No. 80

Time despatched 22.1. 0940.

Addressed to FOREIGN OFFICE No. 80.

Rptd. to Tehran No. 9 Saving.

Situation revealed in Tehran telegram No. 76 causes me some anxiety. If movement which Russians are now encouraging among Kurds spreads southwards, infection of Iraqi Kurds will probably follow. I hope therefore that new arrangements which H.M. Minister is making to meet the suggestions of General Wavell set out in your telegram No. 1235 will enable closer contact to be established with Persian Kurdish tribes outside Russian zone, together with stronger intervention aiming at the speedy settlement of the present conflict between the tribes and the Persian Government. Planned political activity of this kind seems to be the best means open to us locally to prevent spread of disorder. In view of what Russians are themselves doing in Kurdish districts I assume that fear of Soviet Government's acting in a similar manner need no longer be considered as a reason for abstaining ourselves from political activity in Persian Kurdistan.

CORNWALLIS

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INDIV

x Sen-2, A

-/12/-

VH/KC.

RD  
JB  
RK

16 1290/41

2/12/41

152

Tehran. Kurds 152/12/42.  
**TELEGRAM.**

How received :

PARAP

From :

Foreign Office,  
London.

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,

BAGDAD.

Copies to : G.O.C.

Despatched : 19/1/42, 03.10 hrs.

Received : " 17.00 "

Decyphered : " 19.30 "

No. 70

of 18th January, 1942

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to TEHRAN No. 91.

CAIRO  
BAGDAD  
ANGORA.

Following received from Knibyshev No. 88  
of 17th January.

Tehran telegram No. 76.

Sir R. Bullard's tentative analysis of  
the Soviet intentions and motives seem to me con-  
vincing. Vital question is the extent, if any,  
to which the policy of the Soviet Govt. differs from  
that of their officials and agents on the spot.  
And I think we must face the probability that there  
is little difference.

2. The Soviet Govt. have always regarded  
proximity of Baku oilfields to Persian frontier as  
almost, if not quite, as dangerous as the proximity  
of Leningrad to old Finnish and Baltic frontiers;  
and as with these latter frontiers their only chance  
of making a change is to take action while the war  
is still on.

3. Moreover it is not only a question of long-  
term policy: our undisguised interest in Caucasia  
(compare A.O.C. Iraq's ~~suggestion~~ proposal in Bagdad  
telegram No. 1391 of Dec. 20th last) though in fact  
based on perfectly sound considerations of joint  
resistance to the Axis, has never ceased to excite  
Soviet suspicions. They believe - not without some  
reason - that the result of another German drive  
and consequent weakening of their own position in  
the Caucasus might be a situation in which we should  
consider British intervention essential, while they  
did not.

4. On this basis, it is clear that no mere  
appeal to reason will avail. Representations  
already made by yourself and Sir S. Cripps in Moscow  
regarding Kurdish situation met with disingenuous  
replies - particularly as regards "cultural" visit  
to Baku. Our only hope of deflecting the Soviet  
Government from their present policy is to convince  
them that it would not pay them.

5. Can we do this? I do not think that the  
Soviet Govt. would be quite so indifferent to inter-  
fering in Persian supply route as Sir R. Bullard  
suggests in paragraph 8 (4) of his telegram under  
reference. They are well aware of the limitations  
of the northern supply route (utilisation of which

**INDEX**

/has - -

4 of annex  
C.O.C.  
A.O.C.  
V.I.C.  
VA 29/1

152/8/42

He  
H.S.K. 24/1  
VA 20/1

55 3/5/41

CW/SMK  
JM  
AA

Mr. Edwards  
has seen  
? file with V.H.  
O.S. A.M.  
Tel 152/8/42

has not in fact been appreciably improved by their victories in the north because their internal communications in that region were never seriously impaired) and I feel sure that they would regard with real concern the possibility of a breakdown of the southern route.

*also* 6. Difficulty might, however, be, as Sir R. Bullard suggests, to convince the Soviet Govt. that interference in the southern route would be a necessary consequence of the strengthening of their own hold on Azerbaijan or of the disruption of Persian state. They might think that in fact so long as they and we had troops along the main supply routes, these routes would be as secure as before, and that substitution of direct for indirect allied control might even increase their security.

7. I am, of course, aware of the extreme difficulty at the present juncture of coupling any representations on this subject with a threat - even a disguised threat. But unless we could produce convincing proof that the line of thought suggested in previous paragraph would in fact be quite wrong, it may be that the only action which would give the Soviet Govt. the needed jolt and prevent northern Persia at least from going the way of the Baltic states with incalculable consequences to our whole position in the near and middle East, would be a firm hint to the Soviet Ambassador, that persistence in the present Soviet policy in Azerbaijan would mean an interruption of Persian supply route - because we should make it our business to see that it did.

Please repeat to Tehran as my telegram No. 15, India 3, Cairo 6, Bagdad 2, Angola 2.

CW/SNK  
JM  
AA

152/42

Iran: Kurds

152/11/42

SAVINGRAM.

Can. Gov. Act 4 C/C (See 16/1/42)  
GOV  
C/M  
C/C

From: H.M. Minister, TEHRAN.

To: FOREIGN OFFICE.

No. 42

Date: 9th January 1942.



Addressed to Foreign Office	No. 42 (Pl. rpt. Kuiby'ff 12)
repeated to Ankara	" 5
" to India	" 19
" to Baghdad	" 6
" to Cairo	" 6

SAVING

Your telegram No. 2684 to ANKARA.

1. Turkish Ambassador showed me telegram received from the Turkish Consul at REZAIH to the following effect:

BEGINS:

Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians formed party called "liberation" and posted notices calling upon the government officials to leave REZAIH. Police officer and Assyrian who refused to join this party murdered. Armed bands committing robberies in country and town. December 31st Soviet authorities ordered the Governor to reduce number of police in REZAIH from 100 to 45 otherwise they would disband excess over 45.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me similar information and added that at MAKU Soviet authorities ordered withdrawal of Persian-speaking officials saying that only Turkish-speaking men were acceptable.

3. I never quote Persian reports to the Soviet Embassy partly because I distrust their accuracy and partly because the Embassy are sufficiently suspicious already and if the Minister for Foreign Affairs is to be believed Soviet Ambassador has more than once asked him why the Iranian Government always complain against the Soviet and never against the British authorities. I however used the report of the Turkish Consul as the basis of a talk with the Soviet Ambassador, with the approval of the Turkish Ambassador. The excuse I gave was that any difference in policy between us might involve us both in difficulty especially if exploited by third parties. I reminded the Ambassador that I had kept him informed about our Kurdish policy and said that if he wished to inform for information in that or any other point in our policy in Iran I should be happy to supply it. Ambassador did not question my right to raise the subject of Soviet policy in AZERBAIJAN but did not agree that it was faulty in any way.

4. Ambassador accused the Governor of REZAIH of being disloyal. For instance he had given arms to some of the Kurds on the grounds that they were "good" Kurds. Ambassador was convinced (though he had not yet received the information for which he had asked the Soviet authorities concerned) that the liberation movement if there was such a thing was either spontaneous or had been staged by the Governor for some end of his own. I asked on what principle the Soviet authorities were acting in limiting the number of police and gendarmes and explained that the British authorities imposed no such limitations in their zone as they feared that the Iranian Government might use it as an excuse for failure to maintain internal security. Ambassador said that the security organisation collapsed at the time of the Soviet occupation and that when the Minister of the Interior asked for permission to re-establish it the Soviet authorities asked how many men he wanted in each place and assented to these numbers: doubtless the Iranian Government had exceeded the agreed number at REZAIH but the Iranian Government had in fact asked that in certain places the numbers should be increased and the Soviet authorities were considering the request.

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Minister, Tehran, 10.1.1948. To: FOREIGN OFFICE.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent me a copy of note to the Soviet Ambassador in which he refers to the incidents at REZAIH and MAKU and says that the Iranian Government propose to send troops to those parts. I will telegraph again about this.

Addressed to Foreign Office  
Registered to Ankara  
to India  
to Baghdad  
to Cairo

BULLARD.

Your telegram to Ankara to Ankara.

Turkish Ambassador showed me telegram received from the Turkish Consul at REZAIH to the following effect:

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Handwritten notes on the right margin.

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Handwritten notes on the right margin.

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52/42

Lean Kurds 152/10/42.

No. 2.

(638/161/41)



His Majesty's Ambassador  
at  
BAGHDAD,



*With the compliments  
of  
His Majesty's Representative.*

*He*

*Emser*

*W. K. M. M. M.*

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BRITISH LEGATION,

TEHRAN.

7th January 1942.

*M. Edwards*

No. 54.

Confidential.

British Consulate,

TABRIZ.

December 18th, 1941.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith translations of extracts from the local newspapers "Azerbaijan" (published by an Iranian Azerbaijani named Ali Shabistary, but suspected of being under Russian influence at least), and "Vatan Yolinda", published by the Red Army at Tabriz in the local Turkish Dialect.

2. Before considering these extracts, it may be useful to what the Soviet authorities at Baku are alleged to have said to the delegations of Kurds and of non-Kurdish Azerbaijanis who were recently taken on a so-called cultural visit there. I am told by my Turkish colleague, who naturally takes a keen interest in the subject, that the Kurds were addressed separately; they were to return home and reflect on the wonderful things they had seen at Baku, but to be peaceful and law-abiding among themselves and towards their neighbours, and one day they would "realize their hopes". The other Azerbaijanis are said to have been addressed by Bakhiroff, the President of the Soviet Azerbaijan Republic in person. He is stated to have said that as one of the same race and blood, he felt as deeply for the so recently oppressed Iranian Azerbaijanis as they did for themselves, if not more so. But their hardships and calamities were now over, and they would never be allowed to recur. The frontier between Soviet Azerbaijan and Persian Azerbaijan no longer existed in a cultural or psychological sense, and the day would come when the whole of Azerbaijan would be one.

3. I have so far not had an opportunity of checking this, but it seems to accord with what I have recently noticed and reported to you in various telegrams regarding the apparent attitude of the subordinate officers of the Russian political branch here. While Major-Generals and Colonels directed from Moscow may say one thing, their persistent, not particularly well-educated subalterns of Caucasian, Armenian or Russo-Azerbaijani blood and sympathies may be doing quite another, and it is not always clear where the control lies.

4. Their Tabriz newspaper ("For the Country", a somewhat ambiguous title) is published by a Baku Azerbaijani named Azaroglou. When the Iranian authorities once mildly pointed out that their press-laws had not been observed or any permit obtained for this journal, they were told that it was not really an Iranian paper, but was published for the Soviet's "own people" here, which could only mean their political officers and the gang of so-called "refugee" riff-raff they use as spies and informers, who surely can hardly read or write. But efforts are being made to increase the circulation, beginning with the schools, where the policy is to advise the use of the local

form /

His Majesty's Minister,  
British Legation,  
TEHRAN.  
-----

form of Turkish in speaking and reading, instead of the Persian hitherto exclusively used. The reason for this policy on the part of the Soviet political branch can bear only one meaning in the local Iranian eyes. At the same time another pan-Azerbaijan supposedly independent newspaper is seen suddenly to burst forth into twice weekly circulation, with continual complaints against the Iranian administration, open accusations of bribery and corruption in high places, and the same fervent insistence on Azerbaijan's rights to autonomy and to the use of its Turkish dialect - while by a coincidence the only other newspaper and local competitor, advocating for its part sweet reasonableness, distrust of demagogues, and support of the present Iranian Government, is seen suddenly to be raided by the Soviet authorities and closed down for alleged Fascist propaganda.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient

humble Servant.

(Sgd.) M. J. COOK.

December 8th.

Since the Pahlevi regime began 17 years ago, they have stopped our mother-tongue and forced us to learn their language. You people of Azerbaijan, now is the chance to serve our mother tongue, let us open schools, study our philosophy and literature and educate our children in our own tongue, so that within six years we may have doctors, engineers etc.

In the middle ages Tabriz was one of the great cities of Azerbaijan, but it has fallen behind the other cities of Azerbaijan such as Baku, Ganja and others, yet still remains great. It was the capital of Shah Ismail Safavi, the cradle of merchants, travellers, historians and rulers, the centre of trade between Turkey, Russia and India. If you study the historians you will see that Tabriz is Azerbaijani, and the district has not fallen under the influence of Persians, Turks or Tartars, but has remained the country of the great nation which lived there independent long ago. Why are Tabriz and its Azerbaijanis different from the others, forming a special people? It is because its language, character, habitat and economic life are one, and Tabriz and the Azerbaijanis are quite different from the Uzbeks, Persians, Turkomans, Ottomans and others in those four respects.

December 11th.

What has caused the misfortunes of Azerbaijan? Strangers have taken advantage of our sincerity and simplicity to stir up strife and enmity among us, and have hindered all progress. It is time to wake up, to put away enmity and to cease being a tool in the hands of others, who have always tried to destroy the Azerbaijanis because they realized that if Moslems, Armenians, Kurds, Assyrians and others were to unite, they would form a nation famous throughout East and West. We call specially upon the Kurds and Shahsevanis, the brave tribes of purer origin to realize that they are Azerbaijanis and to join us in unity and friendship.

Poem in praise of unity.

In the world there is none so brave as the Kurd, the lover of freedom and pleasure, famous for his noble origin, the enemy of the cruel.

Where are our Armenian brethren, where are our beloved Assyrians, and when will you join us? We are the children of Azerbaijan, the champions of the oppressed, the fearless slayers of tyrants, our power is in union and our honour and our future depend upon it.

December 15th.

Although we have tried to explain our ideas clearly, there are some among both Azerbaijanis and Tehranis who misinterpret our intention.

We believe that everyone should have freedom of speech, thought and writing, but should look on each other as brothers and not use liberty to destroy the rights of others.

We believe that each nation should cherish its own language, customs and character, and should struggle for

its own progress and against interference from outside. We say that Azerbaijan has its special customs and nationality, and that its language should be studied in the schools and have its books written in it.

We wish to tell our Persian-speaking friends (especially the Tehranis), that they must not think that we hate them or think of them as our enemies; on the contrary, we know they are our brothers, but at the same time we declare that their interference in our language, character and administration is against all humanity and law. Our complaint is that while we have looked on them as brothers, they have always considered Azerbaijanis as their servants and underlings. Why do we work, and they reap the benefit? Why does a quarter of the national revenue come from Azerbaijan, but not one tenth is used for its people? They have no interest in us, but only in our wealth and the fruits of our toil. How is it that while Azerbaijanis are famous for their energy and intellect, they have no right to public employment here, while Persian-speaking officials are appointed instead?

We address ourselves especially to those who deliberately misinterpret us. We believe in what we write and have not sold our conscience to others. We will defend our rights and national wealth, and while we help those who respect our nationality, we will fight to the last against those who want to encroach upon our nation, language, customs and prosperity.

Extract from "VATAN YOLINDA" (newspaper published by Red Army at Tabriz, in Azerbaijan Turkish.)

December 17th, 1942.

Letter from Urmia.

Dear Red Army,

Your releasing a nation from misery and disaster is better than a matter of conscience (i.e. than a quibble over ideology?). We Kurds, one of the oldest and noblest of races, have been oppressed by our enemies, and for some years have had no pleasure in life. In a fertile district like Kurdistan poor villagers, farmers and workers could not find bread & where were the crops going? The Fascists regarded Kurds and Azerbaijanis as the lowest of men, calling the former cruel savages and the latter Turkish asses.

On August 27th the Red Army came, and after killing a few Fascist released thousands of oppressed patriots. That date is one written in ineffaceable letters in Kurdish hearts. Dear Red Army, there is a voice crying in Kurdistan and saying: "Please carry out your good deeds to the end and complete our freedom, so that as long as the World lasts the Kurds may be our brothers."

(Sgd.) Rahman Zabihi,  
a Kurd of Sauj-Bulagh.

152  
D.O. No. 2359/6/G.S.I.(C).

URGENT. 152/9/42.



H.Q. Force Iraq.  
Baghdad.

16 January 1942.

Dear Holt,

Thank you for your letter

152/4/42 dated 12th January 1942 to  
Colonel Boyce.

Colonel Boyce is away but I have  
spoken with the Force Commander who  
discussed recently with the Minister in  
Teheran the subject in question. A reply  
to telegram 525 was therefore unnecessary.

The Force Commander does not  
agree that Kurdish rebels should be  
denounced by name and considers that what  
has been notified in general terms is  
sufficient now.

Yours sincerely,

*Russell Morgan*

Capt. V. Holt. C.M.G.  
Oriental Secretary.  
The British Embassy,  
BAGHDAD.

*M. 11*

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Iran: Kurds 152/8/42.

TELEGRAM.

How received:

From: Sir R. Bullard  
TEHRAN.

To: H. M. AMBASSADOR,  
BAGDAD.

Copies to: GOC  
AOC  
CIC

Despatched: 15.1. 1140.  
Received: 15.1. 1730.  
Decyphered: 15.1. 1900

No. 23

of 15th Jan. 1942.

IMPORTANT (First of 2 Parts)

Addressed to Secretary of State for  
Foreign Affairs tel. No. 76 of 15th Jan.

Please repeat to Knibyshev as my tel. No. 25.  
Repeated to Govt. of India tel. No. 36,  
Cairo tel. No. 13,  
Bagdad tel. No. 23,  
Angora tel. No. 11.

My telegram No. 42 and my telegram No. 68.

The Turkish Embassy and the Persian Government have both received official information on January 13th that the Kurds had seized Rezayeh and that Persian (officials) had fled. Both of them tend to be alarmist but see above mentioned telegram from H.M. Consul Tabriz. Before I had seen this telegram I asked the Soviet Ambassador whether he had news from Rezayeh. He said that the Governor had resigned and left; that it was the Governor who had sown the trouble by arming the Kurds and by other acts; and that all was now quiet. The Turkish Ambassador and the Persian Government regard the situation as having been deliberately brought about by the Russians, and there is much to support this belief.

2. I pointed out long ago that the Russians' interpretation of non-intervention in internal affairs differed from ours. In the early days of the occupation they would refuse to assist in the suppression of disorder after they had disarmed the gendarmerie and town-police. In Azerbaijan they have placed the authorities at a disadvantage and have allowed disorder to take its course, if not encouraged it.

3. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Ambassador says that he telegraphed to Moscow more than once about the Persian request to be allowed to increase the gendarmerie but has had no reply. The Ambassador has no influence with the Soviet authorities in Azerbaijan, and is not even well informed as a rule. Whether Moscow formulated the policy which is being followed is (unknown)+. They will repudiate it if it suits them to do so, but it would be difficult to deny the responsibility of the local Soviet authorities.

PARAP

2nd Sec  
AOS.

17/1

Not Recd.  
59/2/42

+ 1 change

SMK/CW  
JB  
RK

I/1. Looks as though 1/1 is the Russian 1st 1st command who are going to make trouble among the Kurds

+2 changes

1/1  
16/1

See  
16/1

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# TELEGRAM.

How received :

From :

To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,  
BAGDAD.

Copies to :

Despatched :

Received :

Decyphered :

No.

of

+2 changes

+1 change

4. (i) The Soviet authorities have refused to allow Persian troops to be stationed not only in the Russian occupied areas, but anywhere north of Qazvin-Tehran-Meshed line. It is impossible for (Persians)<sup>+</sup> to maintain order with the gendarmerie alone. (ii) For some weeks after the occupation, police and gendarmerie were not allowed to carry arms. The Persian Government declared that the arrangement by which the Soviet military authorities allowed (post)ing of a certain number of armed men in the various places referred only to gendarmes, and that there was no limitation of the number of police; and that the Soviet authorities recently ordered reductions of gendarmerie below the agreed scale. My own belief is that the town police were not limited. There was, however, no written agreement, but only a rough map on which numbers were marked here and there. In any case if the Soviet authorities really wished, as they allege, to support the Government, there was no reasonable ground for refusing the increases of gendarmerie in the areas obviously disturbed especially as there was no military support, or for ordering reduction of the town police. A reduction in Tabriz from 400 to 205 was ordered at a moment when, as H.M. Consul reports, Kurds, armed with rifles and even tommy guns, were walking the streets with impunity. (iii) Kurdish leaders were taken to Baku on a cultural visit. There is plenty of evidence that the invitations were pressing. (iv) Although complete evidence cannot be obtained, there is no doubt that on the whole individual Soviet officers and commissars, if not the Soviet authorities, have encouraged the minority and local feeling against the Central Government, labourer against landlord, tax-payer against the Government, the Turkish against the Persian language, and in fact all tendencies making for disruption.

5. End of Part 1.

# TELEGRAM.

How received :

PARAP.

From : H.M. MINISTER, To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,  
TEHRAN. BAGDAD.

Copies to :

Despatched : 15.1.42 (1430)

Received : 15.1.42 (2300)

Decyphered : 16.1.42 (1145)

No. 25 23. of 15.1.42

## IMPORTANT.

### SECOND OF TWO PARTS.

5. My belief at first was that the Soviet Govt. would postpone until after evacuation any serious attempt to disrupt persia and would content themselves with studying the situation and acquiring agents. Recent events in Azerbaijan however suggest an intention to go further. If there is such intention it may have been adopted under the influence of the new factors, e.g.

(1) Victories over the Germans which not only increase the weight of Russia in alliance but make it less necessary to conciliate the persians.

(2) Realisation of key position which Russia holds in the Far East.

(3) Discovery from the inside of rottenness of Persian state.

(4) British loyalty to the persian Government which has prevented our encouraging Kurds and has thus left opening for Russians to pose as their friend.

6. Whatever the motives behind the soviet policy in Azerbaijan, situation is disturbing, and can only be improved if the Persian Government are treated in the north as we treat them in the south, i.e. are allowed to have as many police and gendarmerie as they consider necessary and to support them with reasonable number of troops. Whether that would suffice without cooperation or at least non-intervention from soviet authorities, such as may not be forthcoming is an open question but it is essential minimum. Soviet Government are not likely to grant that minimum on appeal from the Persian Government and I can only suggest that His Majesty's Government should take up the question with the soviet government on the basis of information received from the Turks, and from His Majesty's Consul at Tabriz.

7. Trouble in Azerbaijan offers great disadvantages for us but fact must be faced that these may not weigh seriously with the Soviet Government, whose possible attitude I have suggested in brackets after considerations given in the next paragraph.

8.

(1) Encouragement of Kurds in the North will make British task in the south more difficult. Already Persia military authorities are afraid to continue operations northwards for fear that the Russians should incite the Kurds to resistance. (Excellent, ~~Russian~~ Kurds will now realise that Russia is their only friend).

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(2) Turkish Government will be even more suspicious of the Soviet intention. (Whatever we did Turkey would not be relied upon. We are beating the Germans and can ignore Turkey - at least at present).

(3) Belief that trouble in Azerbaijan is being encouraged by the Russians with a view to eventual annexation is paralysing the Persian Ministry of War, who are unable to attend to urgent problems such as maintenance of security elsewhere (Persian Government is hopeless anyhow and ~~many~~ in any case why should we foster reform of an Army which might be used against us later).

(4) Disorder may spread and may affect Anglo-Russian lines of communication. (These lines will matter less because our victories in Northern Russia will enable greater quantities of goods and war material to be carried via Murmansk. For line of communication in our area we will (be) answerable. Only important other line that might be affected is Rowanduz road which would only be required for British reinforcements for the Caucasus, and we do not need such reinforcements; or if we should need them a little Soviet frightfulness would soon reduce the Kurds to order).

(5) Chaos in the North and North-west which are amongst the richest areas hinders our attempt to rehabilitate the economic life of Persia (Who wants to do anything of the kind? A strong Persia may suit Great Britain, but it does not suit us. Our policy thrives best where people are desperate @ poverty and misgovernment).

@ = W.g.

8. When Persian officials plead apprehension about Soviet policy in Iran I never fail to remind them that when the Treaty is signed they will be in a better position for discussing this as well as other questions with Soviet Government and that their fear that the treaty will make no difference can be tested by the simple expedient of signing it. Unfortunately Azerbaijan situation affects not only the interests of Persia but ours too.

...

Discarded

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7 152/42  
How received :  
PARAP.  
4 of 100

Copy  
GOC  
AOC  
CIC  
14.

@ = w.g.  
3 chs for  
"ish" Not used

+ = 1 ch.

+ / = 1 invsn.

++ = 2 chs <sup>Not used</sup>

@ = mut. gp.

He  
14-1  
16/279/41  
Urdu

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Copy for  
F. 120 a.a.  
Q

SK/JP  
PR/PR

Iran: Kurds 152/5/42.  
**TELEGRAM.**

From : H.M. AMBASSADOR To : H. M. AMBASSADOR,  
ANGORA BAGDAD.  
Copies to : GOC.  
AOC.  
CIC.  
Despatched : 11.1.42 (0210)  
Received : 11.1.42 (0830)  
Decyphered : 12.1.42 (1010)

No. 9 of 10.1.42

Addressed to FOREIGN OFFICE NO. 69,  
rptd to Kuibishev No. 3,  
Tehran No. 5,  
Bagdad No. 9,  
Beirut No. 8,  
Cairo No. 29.

In conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs today, I spoke of Kurd @ question on lines indicated in second(+) paragraph of Moscow telegram No. 27. I said that Molotov had stated that there were no grounds for suspecting any political motive(+) on the part of the Soviets. You had left a paper on the subject with Stalin, and instructions were to be issued to investigate the matter which would in due course be clarified. Molotov had stated that there were no important political factors and the Soviets had no political axe to grind, and there was no reason for Turkish uneasiness(+/-).

2. I also informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuibishev(++) telegram No. 269. He told me he had already received suggestion that Turkish Government should approach Soviet Govt. directly.

3. The Minister for Foreign Affairs received @ statement with some scepticism, remarking that much play was made with the word "political". I said that this word ought to cover anything connected with intrigues for Kurdish independence or activities against States in which the Kurds lived. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was not reassured.

4. As regards Kurds in Iraq, I informed him of Bagdad telegram No. 1365. I added that while in Bagdad last week I had spoken to His Majesty's Ambassador and to General Officer Commanding. Both had said that Kurds in Iraq were well in hand and both had expressed the view that as regards Iraqi Kurds there was no cause for anxiety.

5. As regards Kurds in Syria, I informed him that, while in Aleppo, I had seen Colonel Elphinston who had told me that Jeladet Badr Khan had recently renewed(+) his promise originally made to General Weygand not to create trouble for the Turks who were our Allies.

6. In general the Minister for Foreign Affairs seemed easy(+) in his mind as regards Kurds everywhere except in Persia.

7. He also expressed considerable anxiety as regards Russian activities in Azerbaijan generally.

8. F.O.pl.repeat to Kuibishev as my 3,  
Beirut as my 8.

Iran : Kurds

152/3/42.

Copy to F.O. in P.L.No.9 d'd 12.1.42.

12th January, 1942.

No. 2.  
(152/3/42)

*Jan 13/42*  
Sir,

16/304/41 } I notice that in the enclosure to your despatch No.38 of the 28th December, 1941, it is stated that during the course of an interview with representatives of the Tehran press the Persian Minister for War stated inter alia that "les avions britanniques survolant ces regions ont lance parmi les Kurdes des tracts leur conseillant d'arreter leur opposition contre le gouvernement et de se rendre, en precisant que le gouvernement britannique n'envisage nullement et n'envisagera pas a l'avenir l'eventualite de la creation d'un gouvernement qui s'intitulerait gouvernement du Kordestan".

16/289/291/41 } 2. I should be glad if you would tell me whether this statement is true. From the despatch of His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah No.72 of the 17th December, 1941, to you and his telegram No.56 of the 28th December, I understand that leaflets had been dropped from Persian, not British, aircraft, and the guarded wording of the specimen leaflet enclosed with the above-mentioned despatch does not seem to justify the interpretation given to it by Monsieur Mukhdjavan.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant,

VH/KC  
MWR  
RK  
His Excellency,  
Sir Reader Bullard,  
K.C.M.G., C.I.E.,  
etc., etc.

(Sd.) *Kircher Cornwallis*

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MINUTE.H.E. ✓ *for*

(16/280/274/41)

All paragraphs but the last of this letter deal in the main with the affair of the pamphlets signed by His Majesty's Consul at Kermanshah which were dropped by Persian aircraft on Kurdish villages in Persia (some probably by error were dropped on border villages in Iraq). Your Excellency was not consulted about the dropping of the pamphlets but you were kept informed of what was being arranged by means of the repetition to you of the telegrams which passed between Tehran and Kermanshah on this subject.

The situation in Persian Kurdistan was naturally being dealt with by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran and the British military authorities concerned, ~~and there was no interference from here.~~

Mr. Vaughan Russell was aware of the fact that it was undesirable to drop bombs and pamphlets together (16/289/41) and reported later that the leaflets were dropped on December 17th and bombs on December 20th. So it does not appear that they were mixed.

As regards policy I agree with Colonel Lyon in feeling that there has been drift and lack of coordination. No general directive has been issued by His Majesty's Government or the Minister of State and there is a bewildering number of cooks trying to make the broth.

There are the Foreign Office,  
His Majesty's Legation at Tehran,  
His Majesty's Embassy at Angora,  
the Minister of State,  
Mideast Bureau,  
Colonel Elphinston (in what capacity I don't know, but he has just put out another note on the Kurds)  
Colonel Lyon,  
~~Yourselves,~~  
the Govt. of India, and  
the G.O.C. Iraq and Persia.

Each one naturally and properly tends to deal with the question within what he considers to be his own sphere of responsibility and contradiction between the line taken by one with that adopted by another ~~inevitably~~ results.

The problem, in its essence, is how to keep the Kurds well enough disposed towards the British to prevent their being captured by Axis blandishments, without encouraging them to think that we are supporting them against the several governments whose subjects they are. This political tight-rope walking can only be performed if policy is carefully balanced everywhere by one authority. With so many separate centres of control there is bound to be an overbalancing in one direction or the other from time to time, though not necessarily a fall.

*72*

I fear that Colonel Lyon will regard our request to the Iraqi Government to put pressure on Hama Rashid Khan to withdraw to Iraq from Persia as being likely still further to estrange the Kurds. I think he is coming to Bagdad soon and the best course would probably be for Your Excellency to discuss all these things with him when he comes.

The

The last paragraph concerns a local incident which I believe is being cleared up by the Iraqi and Persian authorities concerned.

10th January, 1942.

OS.  
We heard on 17.12 that General Kasmanshah had been  
instructed to give the fullest possible publicity to his  
statement. That seemed pretty innocuous & it was my  
on 22.1 that we heard they had been dropped  
by plane on the 17.12. The fact that the dropping of the  
statement was followed by the dropping of bombs / was my  
information & has probably created a bad effect though how  
bad we do not know as communications have been cut  
I see that what I was at H. H. H. Tehran  
of course & issue another notice 16/299/41 & you noted  
during that time & HQ was applying. We should get a copy of their  
reply & if there is any question of more proclamations being  
dropped I think we should object at once.  
I agree with you that the present situation is unsatisfactory.  
16/299/41  
Shahabuddin didn't play up & this word was. This is quite  
wrong. If the policy proposed by H.H.H. & Tehran of using Comrades  
is effectively put into force matters should improve.  
At present it is coming here within the next day or two.  
There is a very serious question which has been  
placed with & ask him what reaction there has been.  
If they have been sharp, we can have a telegram on this  
report. Mr. Edmunds told me that the only reaction he had heard  
was from a very chaplain who had not seen anything but had  
assumed we had had to issue a statement in order to keep in  
with the Persian Govt. I personally agree with you that  
a serious situation may arise if the situation is not  
handled in the right way.  
We  
11-1

Iran: Kurds

152/2/42.



DO/11/640.

POLITICAL ADVISER'S OFFICE,  
NORTHERN AREA?  
KIRKUK, 4TH JANUARY, 1942.

Dear Sir W. W. W.

In continuation of my last personal letter of 23rd December, in response to a request by Fletcher I met him in Khanaqin on the 2nd and I now see what General Quinan was getting at when I saw him here on 21st. Fletcher wanted to know (A) what effect the recent dropping of leaflets and bombs in Persian Kurdistan had had or was likely to have, (B) what was happening about the settlement of frontier raids in the Khanaqin area.

When our troops first went to Persia I understood that the British authorities were going to avoid all interference in internal affairs. When Fletcher was last in Baghdad it was decided to encourage the Persians to listen to Kurdish grievances, and to adopt a more democratic attitude towards them. Something in the nature of a Jirga was suggested for arriving at a peaceful settlement. Hama Reshid Khans' Agent was told by Holt that as long as they did not interfere with our troops or Line of Communication we would not take sides against them.

I have now gathered from Fletcher that General Shahbakhti made little or no attempt to proceed on these lines or to make any real attempt to listen to or redress grievances. His procedure was to work through chiefs like Mahmud Khan Kanesonan to divide Kurdish factions, at the same time endeavouring to squash others like Hama Reshid Khan.

Had our troops evacuated Senna it is quite possible that the Kurds would have taken it, but their duration has apparently led to entanglement with interior affairs and General Shah Bakhti has evidently manoeuvred things to a point where some pamphlets signed by the British Consul were dropped on December 16th and some more mixed with bombs the next day.

I enclose a specimen given me by the Mudir of Khurmali. Both the wording and the circumstances seem to suggest a considerable change in policy. I do not know whether you were consulted but I knew nothing about it all

Of course my duties are confined to the Frontiers of Northern Iraq, but as you know there are many tribes which overlap these frontiers. It has been my object (without supporting Hama Reshid Khan & Co) to keep the Kurds friendly and ensure their friendly co-operation with the many patrols etc. which have been moving about in the most remote places. In this I may think claim some small modicum of success up to date but though as yet there has been no reaction probably on account of weather conditions I do not feel at all happy or confident about the future.

If I were a Kurd and had these pamphlets signed by a British Consul dropped upon me mixed with bombs it would not need much German propaganda to convince me that the British were double crossing. Hama Reshid Khan may no doubt be an undesirable person but when the Persians start straggling the Kurds in the area as seems likely, the call for help by the tribesmen affected is unlikely to go unanswered, and we may easily find ourselves lined up against them. I think you should know this before it is too late.

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According to the...  
17/12/42  
24/12/42

the same  
16/209/41

2...

As regards the settlement of Frontier raids in the Khanaqin area, since the retaliation made on Wala Koshiya by the Iraqi authorities (in accordance with the old Turkish custom) on 19th November, there have been no further raids by the Persian tribes, nor have the Iraqis done any raiding. But the Persian Frontier Commissioner is reluctant to make any move though the Qaimaqam of Khanaqin has received him three times since the above date and is ready to co-operate whenever the Persians are prepared for negotiations. The balance of loot is definitely with Persia and the Qaimaqam of Khanaqin says that in the past the Persian officials have shared in the loot and that this, rather than their alleged inability to control the frontier tribes is the real cause of their reluctance. Taba Tabai is due for transfer but Fletcher is going to press for settlement of outstandings before he leaves. Meanwhile so far as the Iraqi side is concerned all is in good order though the Persians are unable to control the Kalkhani tribe (about 400 rifles) which seems to be the chief transgressor up to date. The Qaimaqam thinks that if a British Political Officer was stationed in Qaser Sherin he would be able to bring them up to scratch. But this would mean further interference in internal affairs in Persia. It seems to me that either we ought to clear out of Senna and every where else that does not concern our Line of Communication and war effort and thereby adhere to the original policy or else if we must interfere then we ~~should~~ should go the whole hog and insist on having things as we want them. At the moment we seem to be drifting.

---

Sir K. Cornwallis, K.C.M.G., D.S.O.,  
H.B.M.'s Ambassador,  
Baghdad.

*Yours Sincerely*  
*W. G. M.*

*This is I think*  
*true.*

# آکھی

قنسول دولت اعلیٰ حضرت پادشاهی انگلیس مقیم کرمانشاهان و طوریکه له سفارت  
کبرای انگلیس مقیم طهران له خصوص سیاست دولت پادشاهی انگلیس له خصوص  
پیش آمد فعلی کردستان و اطلاع عموم مردم و ای وسیله ارسینت که دولت  
انگلیس و هیچ طوریک کومک و محمد رشید ناکی سیاست دولت انگلیس مبنی  
بوی تشویق کردن دولت ایران که چون مشغول بر قرار کردن حکومت و  
فرمان روائی خویه لم ناحیه کردستانه موفق بوت البته بشکایات مشروعه اها لی  
رسیدگی و جبران وضعیت سابق اوت .

قنسول دولت انگلیس مقیم کرمانشاهان

جان واگن رسد

چاپخانه کاوه کرمانشاه

HIS Majesty's Representative in Turkey presents his compliments  
to His Majesty's Ambassador, Bagdad  
and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned  
paper.

Angora,

25th December, 1941.

*Reference to previous correspondence:*



*Description of Enclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
To Turkish M. A. 30. 367 dated 25-12-41.	ALLEGED DISTURBANCES AMONG THE KURDISH POPULATION OF IRAN.  H. V. W. 12-1 C. 15-1-42 H. 15-1-42 V. 15-1-42

(Similar letter to Foreign Office, )  
Teheran, Cairo.

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16/292/41 }

His Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to the latter's communications of the 1st and 11th December respectively on the subject of the disturbances which are reported to have been taken place recently among the Kurdish population of Iran, has the honour to inform them that the occurrences mentioned by the Turkish Government have been investigated by the competent British authorities.

This Embassy is authorized to assure the Ministry that the political aspirations entertained by Kurdish tribes have received no support from British or Soviet authorities. Moreover, His Majesty's diplomatic representative in Iran has declared his intention to maintain contact with the Turkish Ambassador in Tehran, and to exchange with him any information on Kurdish subjects which may interest the Turkish authorities.

At the same time, this Embassy wishes to point out that certain reports which have reached the Turkish Government appear to be somewhat exaggerated. For example, the report that the Khanikin-Kermanshah-Tehran road had been cut by brigands (c.f. the Ministry's Note of 11th December paragraph 1) does not appear to be in accordance with the facts.

Ankara,

25th December, 1941.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

ANKARA.